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The New Kansas Buyer
Protection Act
By ARTHUR H. TRAVERS, JR.
INTRODUCTION
The consumer is the hero of the free
market system of economic organization.
Indeed, perhaps the major justification
for the market system is its unmatched
efficiency in satisfying the consumer's
wants. While it has long been recognized
that the proper functioning of the com-
petitive system depends upon consumers
being sufficiently informed and compe-
tent to choose among the goods offered
them, the problem of insuring that the
consumer was informed and competent
failed to receive adequate attention.'
Textbook models of consumer behavior
simply assumed the existence of perfect
knowledge-appending the caveat that
this was not true in the real world. For
the most part we have relied on sellers
to provide the necessary information to
the buyers and hoped that competition
among them would force each seller to
make a reasonably full disclosure and
eliminate misleading and deceptive ad-
vertisements. This approach has not
proved totally successful.
The law did little to improve the sit-
uation. In fashioning the law of mis-
representation, the courts decided that
reasonable buyers-and only reasonable
buyers were considered worthy of legal
protection-would recognize "puffing"
or "dealers' talk" for what it was and
discount it accordingly.2 Under this
1 J. M. CLARK, COMPETITION AS A DYNAMIC
PROCESS 466 (1961).
2 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAw oF
TORTS 567-68 (1956); W. PRossER, TORTS 739
(3d ed. 1964).
theory, sellers could be use a great many
questionable-and uninformative-sales
techniques without fear of legal reprisals.
The courts seem to have ignored the fact
that "dealers' talk" was the only informa-
tion available to guide the consumer, es-
pecially after the revolution in packaging
made inspection impossible in many in-
stances.
In fact the law may have made mat-
ters worse by encouraging sellers to be
even less informative than they otherwise
might have been. The courts distinguished
between misleading representations of
fact (actionable)3 and misleading rep-
resentations of value (not action-
able).4 Naturally sellers looking for maxi-
mum promotional impact with minimum
risk would be encouraged thereby to
eliminate anything in their advertise-
ments that could be labelled "fact" and
replace it with uninformative superla-
tives.5
A spate of relatively recent studies has
confirmed what most knowledgeable ob-
servors had long suspected: Although
the large, industrial buyer is ordinarily
able to inform himself, the average con-
sumer is often not sufficiently informed
to exercise his "sovereignty"6 Even the
8 Federal Agency Investment Co. v. Holm,
123 Kan. 82, 254 Pac. 391 (1927); Kiser v.
Richardson, 91 Kan. 812, 139 Pac. 373 (1914).
4 Reeder v. Guaranteed Foods, Inc., 194 Kan.
386, 399 P.2d 822 (1965); Elerick v. Reid, 54
Kan. 579, 38 Pac. 814 (1895).
5 Note, Developments in the Law-Deceptive
Advertising, 80 HAv. L. REv. 1005, 1017
(1967).
6 J. M. CLARK, supra note 1, at 466.
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well-educated and affluent sometimes
fail to get the most for their money, but
the poor and uneducated-who des-
perately need to get a dollar's value for
a dollar spent-often deepen their pov-
erty by their inability to function prop-
erly in the marketplace.7
Although some courts have attempted
to rectify the situation within the frame-
work of the common law by stretching
traditional concepts,8 for the most part
it has fallen to the legislatures-both
state and federal 9-to enact the measures
necessary to attain.
7 See generally D. CAPLOVrrZ, THE PooR PAY
MORE (1963).
8 A leading case here is Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 448 (D.
C. Cir. 1965).
9 Federal legislation includes the Consumer
Credit Protection Act, 82 Stat. 146; the Fair
Packaging and Labeling Act, 80 Stat. 1296. On
the state level the major development may
prove to be the approval by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws of a Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices
Act. For thorough analyses of the act, see Dole,
The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act:
Another Step Toward a National Law of Unfair
Trade Practices, 51 MINN. L. R~v. 1005 (1967);
Dole, Merchant and Consumer Protection: The
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 76 YALE
L. J. 485 (1967).
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"the goal of implemented customer
competence [which] might be defined
as including a set of market conditions
in which customers of normal judg-
ment are afforded the necessary means
of looking after their interest effec-
tively enough to avoid gross and de-
monstrable errors .... 10
The bulk of this legislation has been di-
rected toward improving the amount and
quality of information available to con-
sumers. The new Buyer Protection Act,
passed by the 63rd Legislature during its
1968 session, has this objective.11 It
commits the resources of the state to a
'
0 J. M. CLARK, supra note 1, at 466.
11 House Bill No. 1782, Ch. 341, 1968 Session
Laws 677. [Hereinafter citation to the act will
be by section without further designation.]
program of eliminating misleading ad-
vertisements and promotional schemes.
While eliminating objectionable adver-
tising does not by itself increase the
consumer, it may do this indirectly by
channeling the promotional activities of
sellers into more desirable channels. This
article seeks to introduce the provisions
of the Buyer Protection Act to those who
may be unfamiliar with them.
THE SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS
The substantive core of the act is found
in Section 2, which declares that
"the act, use or employment by any
person of any deception, fraud, false
pretense, false promise, misrepresenta-
tion, or the concealment, suppression
or omission of any material fact with
intent that others rely upon such con-
cealment, suppression or omission, in
connection with the sale or advertise-
ment of any merchandise, whether or
not any person has in fact been misled,
deceived or damaged thereby, is .. .
an unlawful practice ... "
Not only is the word "person" defined to
include any form of business organiza-
tion; the definition also includes the
"legal representative" of any natural per-
son and "any agent, employee, salesman,
partner, officer, director, member, stock-
holder, associate, trustee or cestui que
trust" of any business organization. The
intention here seems to be to prevent
evasion of the act's prohibitions by deny-
ing to a defendant the defense that his
agent or employee had no authority to
engage in the behavior objected to. It
was not uncommon in the past for a con-
sumer to go without relief because he
could not establish a salesman's authority
to make the objectionable representa-
tions. Under this definition the state
need only show that the actor served the
defendant in one of the enumerated ca-
pacities; it will not be incumbent upon the
state to show that the actor was operat-
ing within his orders from the defend-
ant.12 This means that on occasion, a
defendant will be held responsible when
an employee in fact exceeded his author-
ity. Given the nature of the remedies
granted by the act, this will ordinarily
not work a hardship on the defendant,
but it will provide an incentive for sellers
to police their salesmen and copy-writ-
ers to insure against repetitions. On
balance, it seems to be sound not to clut-
ter up a significant number of lawsuits
with issues about the actor's authority.
By defining "merchandise" to include
"any objects, wares, goods, commodities,
intangibles, real estate situated outside
the state of Kansas or services," 13 the
legislature has brought under the act
sellers of items that might ordinarily not
be considered "merchandise" but which
have on past occasions been promoted in
a questionable manner. These include
desert or swampland passed off on Kan-
sas residents with glowing descriptions
of life during the sunset years in Arizona
or Florida, and "services" life quickie or
correspondence schools that purport to
educate their students to step into glam-
orous jobs in various trades but in fact
do very little to improve their students'
vocational abilities or opportunities.' 4
The definition of "sale" to include
any ... offer for sale, or attempt to sell
... for cash or on credit"I'5 and "adver-
tisement" to include any attempt "to in-
duce directly or indirectly any person
to enter into any obligation or acquire
any title or interest in any merchandise"'6
ought to permit the state to intervene
12 Dispensing with proof of this issue seems
especially wise when one considers that evidence
on the point is almost totally within the control
of the defendant and persons dependent upon
the defendant for their livelihood.
13 § 1 (b).
14 As is pointed out in W. MAGNUSON & J.
CARPER, THE DARK SIDE OF THE MARKET-
PLACE 25 (1968) these schools usually fleece
uneducated persons trying to better their lot
by improving themselves.
15 § 1 (d).
16 § 1 (a).
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against an advertisement or promotion
at any stage; clearly, they evidence an
intention to eliminate such traditional is-
sues as the location of "title". One inter-
esting facet of the definition of "adver-
tisement" is the specific inclusion of any
device to disguise a solicitation as a bill
or other document conveying the impres-
sion that the consumer already has a le-
gal obligation to pay for the goods. Thus,
the statute clearly encompasses such
techniques as sending requests to renew
magazine subscriptions dressed up as
"invoices." By the same token it ought to
empower the state to go after merchants
who will unordered merchandise to con-
sumers and mail a "bill" a few days later.
It is too early to predict whether Sec-
tion 2 will be interpreted in such a way
as to permit the state to enforce a stan-
dard of business behavior which is mate-
rially higher than that called for by the
common law of misrepresentation. Yet
there seems little doubt that the legisla-
ture intended to adopt a standard of il-
legality that would not be restricted in
its growth by common law concepts. To
this end, it expressly provided that cer-
tain common law issues were irrelevant
in actions under the act. For example,
the common-law plaintiff had to estab-
lish that he had relied upon the defend-
ant's representation" and had sustained
an injury as a result therof.'5 But in an
action to enforce the new act the state
need not show that anyone '"as in fact
been misled, deceived or damaged" by
the misrepresentation-whether it be out-
right falsehood, studied ambiguity, half-
truth, or failure to disclose. As a result it
will be unnecessary in many cases for
the state to produce any actual consum-
ers of defendant's product, let alone
show that they had been exposed to de-
fendant's advertising. The removal of
this evidentiary burden should signifi-
173 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 546 (1938).
Is Ibid.
cantly increase the number of sellers
against whom the state can act.19
Moreover, proof of reliance at common
law often meant that plaintiff was re-
quired to establish a causal connection
between the misleading element of an
advertisement and his purchase.20 Con-
sequently, sellers could use certain ques-
tionable practices-like adopting a cor-
porate name that suggested a large
organization, such as American, Federal,
or National21-that a plaintiff would be
hard pressed to show were significant
factors inducing his purchase. This ob-
stacle will not confront the state.
Elimination of the need to show dam-
age also will increase the number of prac-
tices that the act makes vulnerable. Sup-
pose an advertisement claims a sewing
machine is a $400.00 value but priced at
$200.00 whereas the machine is only
worth $200.00. Since any purchaser
would know what he was getting and
the price and since any purchaser would
pay what the machine was "worth" and
no more, the damage, if any, lies in the
disappointment of the buyer's expectancy
that he was getting a bargain. 22
While there may be sound reasons
for refusing to award such an expectancy
to individual plaintiffs, they should not
hinder the state's effort to improve the
(Continued on page 51)
"9 If a particular advertisement is attacked as
deceptive, it may be necessary to prove the
capacity of the advertisement to deceive. How-
ever, as noted later it is possible to prove this
by ways that do not involve the production of
deceived consumers.
20 1 F. HArm & F. JAMES, supra note 2, at
583-86.
21 Note, Translating Sympathy for Deceived
Consumers Into Effective Programs for Protec-
tion, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395, 398 n. 28 (1966).
12 The courts and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion have had no difficulty finding that this is
a deceptive practice under § 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act. See generally G. AL-
EXANDER, HONESTY AND COMPETITION 118-24
(1967). The leading case on deceptive pric-
ing is FTC v. Standard Edue. Soc., 302 U. S.
112 (1937).
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(Continued from page 14)
quality of information reaching its con-
sumers.
In addition to dispensing with reliance
and damage, Section 2 erects two sep-
arate standards of illegality that vary in
the extent to which they depart from the
common-low. "Concealment, suppres-
sion or omission" is unlawful only if "a
material fact" is concealed, suppressed or
omitted and the defendant had an "intent
that others rely upon such concealment,
suppression, or omission," but if the prac-
tice complained of involves the use of
"any deception, fraud, false pretense,
false promise, [or] misrepresentation,"
the state need not prove that a "fact" was
misrepresented, that it was "material," or
that the defendant had "scienter."23 Since
the draftsmen of Section 2 were careful to
make these common-law concepts inap-
plicable to "any deception" etc., it can
hardly be that terms like "fraud" and
"misrepresentation" were intended to be
given their ,common law meanings. To
use those meanings-which include
"materiality" 24 and "scienter"25
-would
be to smuggle back into the act restric-
tions that the legislature meant to re-
move.
If the above analysis is sound, even
words like "fraud" in Section 2 have a
potential for growth, but the key word
here is likely to be "deception." A similar
term-deceptive practices 26-in the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act has enabled
the Commission and the courts to shift
their emphasis from the advertisement's
? It is enough if the defendant intended to
induce the plaintiff to act upon a false state-
ment; scienter does not require any intent to
injure. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 2,
at 532-33.
24 "Materiality" means that a reasonable buyer
would consider the undisclosed fact impor-
tant. See 3 RESTATEMENT , TORTS § 538 (1938).
25 See 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 525 (1938).
26 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
correspondence to literal truth 2 to its
impact upon the consumer. The question
has been whether the advertisement has
the "capacity to deceive." 28
Emphasizing the impact on the con-
sumer in turn implies the construction
a model consumer through whose eyes
the advertisement is perceived and un-
derstood. This seems especially true
under section 2 since the state need not
produce any "deceived" consumers to
show deception. 2
9
Under the Federal Trade Commission
Act, the FTC has been required to estab-
lish that the advertisement in question
has the capacity to deceive not the "rea-
sonable man" of the common law-that
perceptive, attentive, skeptical paragon
-but the "average" consumer, who may
be careless or credulous. Indeed, language
in some of the cases30 suggests that an
advertisement may be illegal if it will
mislead the "wayfaring fool"31 the sort
of chap who thinks that corn flakes sprin-
kled into a piano will really make piano
legs grow.
What seems to have occurred is that
the courts and the FTC balanced the sell-
er's interest in phrasing his advertise-
ment in a particular way against the risk
-however remote-of some consumer
being misled.32 The weights assigned to
these interests indicate a somewhat dif-
27 The FTC may, however, compel literal
truth. Moretrench Corp. v. FTC, 127 F.2d
792, 795 (2d Cir. 1942).
28 Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC,
143 F.2d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 1944).
29 This would be so even if the state had to
produce deceived consumers since it could al-
ways be questioned whether the consumers
produced were representative of the advertise-
ment's audience; hence, some sort of comparison
of the witnesses' characteristics with a model
would seem required.
30 E.g., Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.
2d 869, 872 (2d Cir. 1961).
31 The language is from General Motors Corp.
v. FTC, 114 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1940), in
which the court quoted from the prophet Isa-
iah.32 See Note, supra note 5, at 1042.
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ferent scheme of values than that which
prevailed at common law: Any appreci-
able risk of deception is treated as exces-
sive, especially if it appears that the seller
has alternative ways of phrasing his
message that do not create such as risk.33
Vanished almost entirely is the idea that
some risk of deception is tolerable be-
cause the consumer is obligated to protect
himself. The elimination of this duty of
self-protection has dictated the choice of
the "wayfaring fool" rather than the
"reasonable man" to serve as a model.
The draftsmen of the new Kansas act
evidently intended to depart from the
common law by making illegal at least
some devices that would not deceive the
"reasonable" man, but it is too early to
gauge the extent to which the courts will
sanction a departure from the common
law.
Another interesting question posed by
the act is the extent to which Section 2
may impose upon sellers and advertisers
an affirmative duty to disclose informa-
tion about their products that they
would prefer to keep hidden. Section 2
does declare that "any concealment, sup-
pression, or omission of any material fact
with intent that others rely upon such
concealment, suppression or omission," is
unlawful, but this language may do little
more than enact the common law.
Although the Kansas court has often
reiterated the accepted rule that parties
to an arm's length transaction, such as a
merchant and consumer, have no obliga-
tion to disclose information to each
other,34 several cases have held "conceal-
33 For example, in Gelb v. FTC, 144 F.2d
580 (2d Cir. 1944), the court agreed with the
FTC that defendant's description of its hair col-
oring as permanent might induce some purchas-
ers to think it would dye hair that had not grown
out. It seems highly unlikely that an appre-
ciable number of persons would put that inter-
pretation on the advertisement, but eliminating
the objectionable word would not materially
restrict the defendant's ability to convey his
message.
34 E.g., Ferguson-McKinney Dry Goods Co. v.
Grear, 76 Kan. 164, 90 Pac. 770 (1907).
ment"-as distinct from "nondisclosure"
-to be actionable fraud. Jenkins v. Mc-
Cormick35 found fraudulent concealment
where a contractor covered a defective
concrete floor with title to hide its con-
dition from prospective home buyers,
knowing that the condition of the con-
crete would later cause the tile to crack
and come loose. Larrick v. Jacobson3
6
invalidated a mortgage secured from a
husband and wife upon their homestead.
The wife had previously told the mort-
gagee that she would never sign a mort-
gage on that property, but he remained
silent while the wife signed the mortgage,
knowing full well that she thought the
mortgage covered a different tract and
would not have signed had she known
the truth.
The point to note about these cases is
that neither raises serious questions
about materiality and scienter. The con-
tractor's behavior alone warrants the in-
ference that he knew the floor's condition
would be a significant factor in any rea-
sonable buyer's purchase decision 37 and
that he intended to affect that decision.
38
Likewise there is no doubt of the mort-
gagee's knowledge of the importance of
the undisclosed information and his
specific intent that the wife should sign
a result of her mistaken impression.
The new act also requires that the state
establish the materiality of any con-
cealed, suppressed or omitted facts
and defendant's scienter. If proof of
these elements means establishing either
that the defendant deliberately con-
cealed information otherwise available
to the consumer (Jenkins) or that the
consumer specifically informed the de-
fendant that a particular factor was
crucial to his purchase decision and the
defendant'knew the consumer was mis-
35 184 Kan. 842, 339 P.2d 8 (1959).
3 139 Kan. 522, 32 P.2d 204 (1934).
" Were this not the case, he would hardly
have gone to the trouble of concealing the floor.
38 It is not necessary that he intended to
change that behavior.
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taken (Larrick), the statute will impose
no greater duty to disclose than did the
common law. The imposition of a greater
duty can result only if the courts are will-
ing to hold a seller who fails to disclose
otherwise unavailable information about
his merchandise on the ground that any
reasonable person in the seller's position
would know that a buyer would consider
the information significant, and hence
the intent to affect the buyer's behavior
can be inferred from the nondisclosure.
The trouble with this theory is that it
affords no basis for limiting the seller's
duty to disclose. Almost anything viewed
in retrospect may seen significant in-
formation. Obviously, it is not possible
for an advertisement to contain every-
thing that a buyer might like to know
about the product. And it would prob-
ably be undesirable even if it were pos-
sible, since consumers would be inun-
dated with such a mass of data that they
could not be expected to assimilate it.
Ideally, the duty to disclose should be
imposed very gradually with the objec-
tive of requiring every advertisement
eventually to meet some minimum level
of informativeness.
Something of this sort may be occur-
ring under the Federal Trade Commission
Act. In 1950 the FTC's attempt to require
the maker of an iron tonic to disclose in
its advertisements that most tired people
were not suffering from iron deficiency
anemia and hence would not be helped
by the tonic was overturned by the fed-
eral court.3 9 Recently, however, the Sixth
Circuit approved an FTC order requir-
ing the maker of Geritol to disclose the
the identical information.4° The differ-
ence in result seems attributable to the
difference in the theories espoused by
the FTC.41 In the earlier case, the FTC
argued that every advertisement contains
39Alberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir.)
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 818 (1950).4 0 J. B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884
(6th Cir. 1967).
41 See Note, supra note 5, at 1048.
an implied representation that all mate-
rial facts had been disclosed, a theory of-
fering no way of distinguishing between
what must be disclosed and what may be
kept hidden. In the later case, the FTC
offered no sweeping principle and the
court's opinion articulates none. All that
can be said is that the FTC and the
courts are somewhat gingerly forcing af-
firmative disclosures by advertisers in
some cases. It is hoped that the Kansas
act will be similarly pushed beyond the
common law to require affirmative dis-
closures in some cases on a case-by-case
basis that allows some limiting principle
to emerge.
Section 2 is limited by two provisos.
First, the owner of the medium of com-
munication that disseminates the adver-
tisement is not hold responsible if he
"has no knowledge of the intent, design
or purpose of the advertiser." With some
such exemption for media owners it is
hard to quarrel, but two features of the
present exemption seem open to ques-
tion. First, the owner must have "knowl-
edge" of the advertiser's intent, design
or purpose instead of "notice." This sug-
gests that an owner having no actual
subjective knowledge would be excul-
pated even though a reasonable person in
the owner's position should have realized
what was going on.42 In effect this sub-
jective test eliminates any pressure on the
owner to conduct any investigation
before accepting advertising copy. In-
deed, it may discourage such an investi-
gation since information of which the
owner has actual knowledge makes him
subject to the act. Accordingly, there is
an advantage to knowing as little as pos-
sible. Had the act been drafted in such
a way as to induce media owners to in-
vestigate advertisers and reject question-
able advertisements, it would have pro-
vided a material aid to the state in
42 This is the conventional distinction between
"notice" and "knowledge." See, e.g., the dis-
cussion in W. SrAvEY, Ac ncY 17-18 (1964).
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achieving its objective of improving the
information reading consumers.
Furthermore, it is the advertiser's in-
tent, design or purpose of which the
owner must have knowledge. This per-
mits a medium owner to accept with
impunity advertising which he knows to
be untrue, deceptive, or otherwise illegal
so long as he knows nothing about the
state of mind of the advertiser. There
seems to be no reason why an owner
should escape responsibility for dis-
seminating advertising that he knows to
be illegal. Here too the draftsmen seem
to have passed up an opportunity to
maximize the impact of the new act in-
ducing to media owners to refuse unlaw-
ful advertising.
By a second proviso the act is made in-
applicable to "any advertisement which
is subject to and complies with the rules
and regulations of, and the statutes ad-
ministered by the federal trade commis-
sion." Thus, the advertisement must first
be one over which the FTC has jurisdic-
tion, which, as a practical matter, means
that interstate commerce in involved.43
If false advertising of food, drugs, de-
vices, or cosmetics is under attack, the
FTC has jurisdiction if the advertiser
has engaged in interstate advertising
whether he has made any interstate sales
or not.,4 If other goods we're involved,
the 1941 case of FTC v. Bunte Brothers,45
in which the Supreme Court held that
the FTC could not reach purely intra-
state transactions that affect interstate
commerce, presumably controls. The
FTC has never directly challenged the
case46 although it has successfully as-
" Another jurisdictional limitation-that the
proceeding appear to the reviewing court to be
in the "public interest"-has fallen into utter
disuse. Compare FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19
(1929), with Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295
F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1961).
4Mueller v. United States, 262 F.2d 443
(5th Cir. 1958).
4r 312 U.S. 349 (1941).4 6 G. ALEX Dr'ER, HoNEsry AND COMPETrTON
3 (1967).
serted jurisdiction over intrastate acts
related to interstate activity.47 Under
either approach, however, a substantial
number of activities occur wholly within
Kansas and are not exempted from the
act.
Even if the FTC would have jurisdic-
tion over the activity, there is no excep-
tion from a state suit unless the advertise-
ment complies with FTC standards.
Undoubtedly this exemption would pro-
tect a seller who could show that the very
advertisement challenged by the state
had been approved by the FTC, but few
sellers will be in that position. It might
be argued that the exemption should be
restricted to those cases in which the
particular advertisement in issue has
been sanctioned by the FTC. This nar-
row interpretation presupposes that the
exemption is designed solely to avoid
conflict between federal and state en-
forcement agencies in particular cases.
A broader and, to my mind, prefer-
able interpretation would permit any
merchant to show that if the FTC's rules
and standards were applied to his adver-
tisement, it would be held lawful. This
construction assumes that the proviso has
the broader purpose of not subjecting
merchants subject to both state and fed-
eral jurisdiction to conflicting standards
of behavior. In effect the state would be
working with the federal government by
enforcing federally created standards
against activities in interstate commerce
that the FTC has not gone after.48 It is
well known that the FTC lacks the re-
sources to attack more than a small por-
tion of the deceptive advertising under
its jurisdiction.49 State enforcement of
federal standards can free the FTC to
devote most of its time to bringing those
47 E.g., Bankers Sec. Corp. v. FTC, 297 F.2d
403 (3d Cir. 1961).
41 Of course, the state might choose to enforce
less rigorous standards than are presently being
enforced by the FTC; in that event, the proviso
would act as a kind of ceiling.
49 See W. MAGNIUSON & J. CARPER, supra note
14, at 78-80.
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cases that offer opportunities for doc-
trinal development while the state makes
sure the law is obeyed.50 Of course, with
respect to intrastate activities the state is
free to develop its own standards.
With respect to the "chain referral
sales" technique, the draftsmen departed
from the approach of making a promo-
tion or advertisement unlawful only if it
was fraudulent or deceptive and adopted
a flat prohibition against the use of any
referral sales scheme to induce a "buyer"
to purchase merchandise for a price in
excess of $50.00. 51 Under the typical re-
ferral sales scheme, a merchant tells a
prospective purchaser that for every per-
son referred to the merchant by the pur-
chaser who buys the same or similar
merchandise the merchant will give the
purchaser a stated "commission."5 2 Often
this technique is combined with other
questionable practices and almost always
it is used to distract the consumer's atten-
tion from the details of the transaction
he is about to enter, thus making other
deceptive practices more effective. 53
Evidently, the legislature decided that
the referral sales technique is so likely to
be used to mulct consumers and so rarely
used in good faith that it was not worth
the administrative inconvenience to at-
tempt a case-by-case examination of the
practice. The only qualifications .to the
rule are that the purchaser must be pur-
chasing the merchandise for household
' This would, of course, require the. state
courts to apply standards which they have no
hand in creating. This is not a particularly dif-
ficult assignment, and it is essentially what is
called for under choice-of-law rules and the
doctrine of Erie RR. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
r' § 3.
52 Were such a scheme used deceptively, it
would undoubtedly be covered by § 2. The
element of chance is so strong in a referral sales
scheme, however, that some states have held
them illegal under state lottery laws. E.g., Sher-
wood & Roberts-Yakima, Inc. v. Leach, 409 P.
2d 160 (Wash. 1965).
53 See Note, supra note 21, at 398-99.
consumption5 4 and that the price of the
purchase-not the "value"-must exceed
$50.00
ENFORCEMENT
The act empowers either the Attorney
General or a county attorney to take the
initiative in eliminating unlawful prac-
tices. 55 In either case, the act provides
for cooperation between the Attorney
General's office and the local county at-
torneys. Should the Attorney General
initiate the action, he may request such
assistance as he needs from the county
attorney in the locality in which the
action is brought. 6 On the other hand, if
a county attorney brings the action, he is
required "to make a full report thereon to
the attorney general including the final
disposition of the matter." On its most
literal reading this provision would re-
quire no communication from the county
attorney to the Attorney General un-
til the case was concluded; it does not
prescribe who shall determine the con-
tents of those reports. Yet the structure of
the act leaves no doubt that is the At-
torney General who hears the primary en-
forcement responsibilities under the act.
Furthermore, sound administration would
dictate that the state evolve a single en-
forcement policy and that each enforce-
ment agency operate within the frame-
work so established. Finally, the Attorney
General's office will develop specialists in
buyer protection. However able a county
attorney may be, he is unlikely to have
this sort of expertise.5 7 All of these factors
54This result comes about through the defini-
tion of a "buyer" in § 1 (e) as one who pur-
chases "not for resale in the ordinary course of
his trade or business but for his use or that of
a member of his household or in connection
with the operation of his household."
5 § § 4, 8, 14.
16 § 14.
51 It would seem that under ordinary doctrines
of res judicata the attorney general would be
barred from attacking any practice that had
been the subject of an unsuccessful suit by the
county attorney; hence, it is important that the
first suit be properly tried.
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suggest that the purpose of the act would
best be served if the local attorneys were
required to submit progress reports to
the Attorney General's office at each
stage of any litigation they commence, in
such form and with such content as the
Attorney General's office may prescribe.
It should also be understood that the At-
torney General is free to oversee and
direct any action at anytime.
The extent to which a county attorney
will play a role in any given action will
in most cases depend upon the location
of the trial, which in turn is determined
by the venue provisions of Section 13.
These give the state a choice of courts in
which to bring an action. Any defend-
ant-resident or nonresident-may be
sued in the district court of any county
in which an unlawful practice occurred.
Thus, if an advertiser disseminated un-
lawful advertising in every county in
Kansas, he could be sued in every county.
If the defendant is a resident of Kansas,
action may also be brought where the
defendant resides. Whether resident or
nonresident, if the defendant has his
principal place of business in Kansas, he
may be sued where that principal place
of business is located. If the defendant
has neither a residence nor a principal
place of business in Kansas, he may be
used in the district court of Shawnee
county, a location offering maximum con-
venience to the Attorney General. It may
be expected that the Attorney General
will attempt to lay venue in the most
convenient court possible and, in such
cases, there will be little or nothing for
the county attorney to do. Only if the
venue provision compels an action to be
brought in an inconvenient location will
the Attorney General rely heavily upon
the county attorney.
The basic remedy afforded the state
under the act is the injunction. When an
enforcement agency has "reasonable cause
to believe that any person has engaged
in, is engaging, or is about to engage in"
an unlawful practice it may file for an
injunction.5 8 The court is not limited to
the granting of preventive relief; it may
also order the restoration by any appro-
priate means of money acquired by the
defendant as a result of a violation of
the act. 9 Presumably, in the ordinary
case, it would suffice if the defendant
paid a sum of money into court for distri-
bution, by means of a master or other-
wise, to the defendant's customers. But
if the defendant's violation is "substan-
tial and willful" the court may revoke
any certificate or license permitting the
defendant to do business in Kansas or
appoint a receiver 6° who is given the
power to collect every asset of the defend-
ant derived through a practice made il-
legal under the act, together with every
other asset with which they may have
been commingled. 61 Thus if it is not pos-
sible to segregate those of .the defend-
ant's assets acquired as a result of an
unlawful practice the receiver may be
empowered to take over the defendant's
entire business. The assets which thus
pass into the receiver's hands are to be
held for the benefit of those who have
suffered damage as a result of the de-
fendant's illegal practices the receiver is
empowered either to distribute the assets
collected in kind or to sell the assets and
distribute the proceeds. Claimants under
the act are treated in the same manner as
the defendant's general creditors and are
entitled to receive all out-of-pocket
losses they are able to prove. -6 2 It is to be
noted that no expectancy interest is
awarded claimants under this act. Thus,
if the defendant tells the plaintiff that
58§ 8.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.61§ 9.
02 § 12 provides that the provision of the act
"shall not bar any claim against any person
who has acquired any moneys or property, real
or personal, by means of any practice herein
declared to be unlawful," except where there
has been a court order terminating the defend-
ant's business affairs "after receivership pro-
ceedings."
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defendant's aluminum siding is a "$400.00
value" that the plaintiff can have for
$250.00 whereas the siding is in fact
worth $175.00, plaintiffs damages are
$75.00, not $225.00. One may expect that
a receiver will not often be appointed.
Not only is the relief unusually severe,
but it requires more state resources to be
devoted to a single case than can be
spared except in extraordinary circum-
stances.
If the act is to be administered with
maximum efficiency the overwhelming
majority of cases will have to be disposed
of through an informal settlement pro-
cedure leading to an "assurance of dis-
continuance." Only in this way will the
state be able to proceed against a suffi-
cient number of defendants. 63 Assurances
are required to be in writing and filed
with a district court having proper venue
under the act. The chief advantage to
the state in securing such an assurance
lies in the fact that a violation of the as-
surance within six years of its filing is
deemed "prima facie proof of a viola-
tion" of the act. Thus, if the state sought
injunctive or other judicial relief ini-
tially, it would have the burden of estab-
lishing that the defendant's conduct was
proscribed by the act. If, however, the
state accepted an assurance of discontin-
uance and later sued to enjoin a violation
of the assurance, the state need show
only that the assurance had been violated.
The defendant would then have the bur-
den of persuading the court that its con-
duct did not violate the act.
6 4
The act offers two inducements to de-
fendants to sign an assurance. First,
violation of an injunction will subject a
M § 10.
G4 Actually, the use of the phrase "prima facie"
suggests only that the court would be warranted
in finding a violation of the law, not that it
would be compelled to. Nevertheless, since
the burden shifted to the defendant is one of
establishing a point of law' instead of estab-
lishing a set of facts, it would seem that the
view expressed in the text is the more logical
one.
defendant to liability for a civil penalty
of $10,00065 whereas violation of an as-
surance will lead only to a suit for an in-
junction under the circumstances outlined
above.6  Second, the act provides that an
assurance "shall not be considered an ad-
mission of a violation for any purpose."67
Although the act is not crystal clear on
this point, this provision seems to relate
to the use that a subsequent private liti-
gant may make of the assurance. If the
state were forced to seek judicial relief
against a defendant, statements made
during that proceeding and, perhaps,
even the final judgment of that proceed-
ing could be used by a subsequent private
plaintiff under the admissions exception
to the hearsay rule.68 A defendant who
considers defeat likely or who believes
he will be required to admit facts that
might later be used against him will have
some incentive to execute an assurance.6 9
The initiation of a judicial proceeding
(leading either to judgment or an assur-
ance) or the acceptance of an assurance
without litigation will ordinarily be pre-
ceded by some sort of state investiga-
tion. The act grants the state agencies ex-
tensive investigatory powers, but it is not
mandatory that every action be preceded
by an investigation so complete as to
call into use any or all of the powers so
granted. An informal investigation would
65§ 11.
66 This assumes that an assurance, although
filed in court, is not a "court order" within the
meaning of § 11.
67 § 10.
68 See generally, 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
1048059 (3rd ed. 1940).
69 A parallel arrangement exists under the
federal antitrust laws. Under § 5 (a) of the
Clayton Act, final judgments rendered against
a defendant in a government action may be
used as prima facie evidence of a violation in
a subsequent private action against that de-
fendant, with the exception that consent judg-
ments rendered before any evidence was taken
shall not be so used. See generally Timberlake,
The Use of Government Judgments of Decrees
in Subsequent Treble Damage Actions Under
the Antitrust Laws, 36 N. Y. U. L. REV. 991
(1961).
SPRING 1969
be sufficient if it gave the state agency
reasonable cause to believe that a viola-
tion had occurred, was occurring or was
about to occur.
Still, as a matter of tactics, a full scale
investigation would often be the best
route for an agency contemplating an
action. All that is required is that the
state agency receive a verified complaint
setting forth facts showing a past or pres-
ent (but not threatened) violation and
that it determine that an investigation
would be in the public interest.70 Then
the agency may require the alleged viola-
tor to file a statement under oath setting
forth whatever information the agency
requires;71 any person-not merely an
alleged violator-may be examined;7
2
books records, documents and other ma-
terial evidence may be examined or,7 3
pursuant to a court order, impounded.7 4
The act provides that any subpoena or
notice issued in connection with the con-
duct of such an investigation as well as
any action filed to enforce the act may be
served outside the state of Kansas in any
one of a variety of ways.75 By its terms
the act does not require that the person
so served have any contact with the state
of Kansas. Under recent Supreme Court
70 § 4.
71§ 4 (1).
72§ 4 (2).
73 § 4 (3).
74§ 4 (4).
7 § 6 provides that if personal service within
the state cannot be obtained, then substituted
service may be made in any of the following
ways: "(a) Personal service . . .without this
state; or (b) the mailing . . .by certified mail
to the last known place of business, residence
or abode within or without this state of such
person for whom the same is intended; or (c)
in the manner provided in the code of civil
procedure ... ; or (d) such service as the dis-
trict court may direct in lieu of personal ser-
vice within this state."
rulings a state is entitled to compel non-
resident corporations-and possibly non-
resident individuals and unincorporated
associations-to appear in its courts if the
party served has sufficient contacts with
the state to make his appearing there not
unfair. 76 It is to be doubted whether a
state agency would take an interest in
any alleged violator who did not have
such contacts. Thus, the systematic ad-
vertising in Kansas or even the sporadic
selling to Kansas residents ought to be
enough to support jurisdiction,77 although
the point has not been definitively set-
tled. More troublesome is the provision
granting the state agency the power to
subpoena an out-of-state nonresident wit-
ness in the course of an investigation. In-
vocation of that power will probably be
met by constitutional challenge and the
outcome is very much in doubt.
Finally, the provision for a $10,000
civil penalty for the violation of any in-
junction or court order issued pursuant
to the act is also the ultimate sanction
against those who refuse to cooperate
with .the state agency conducting an in-
vestigation, but a two-step process is re-
quired. First, the agency must get a court
order designed to secure such coopera-
tion.7 8 Further recalcitrance subjects the
person to liability for the penalty.79
76 See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220 (1957); International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
77 Cf. the discussion in Tilley v. Keller Truck
& Implement Corp., 200 Kan. 641, 438 P.2d
128 (1968), upholding the constitutionality of
the Kansas long-arm statute, K.S.A. § 60-308.
78§ 7.
79 The exact nature of the proceeding to im-
pose this penalty is unclear. Although the
penalty is labelled a "civil" penalty, the act is
headed "Crimes and Punishment." Moreover,
the penalty seems designed to vindicate the
power of the court as well as to secure com-
pliance with the court's order.
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